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ISIS in Their Own Words: Recruitment History, Motivations for
Joining, Travel, Experiences in ISIS, and Disillusionment over
Time – Analysis of 220 In-depth Interviews of ISIS Returnees,
Defectors and Prisoners
Abstract
Two hundred and twenty Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) defectors, returnees, and
imprisoned ISIS cadres were in-depth interviewed by the author, a research psychologist
working for the International Center for the Study of Violent Extremism (ICSVE) from
2015-2019. These interviews were conducted in Turkey, Iraq, Syria, the Balkans, Europe,
and Central Asia with ISIS prisoners, returnees, and defectors. The purpose was to learn
about their recruitment history, motivations for joining, travel, experiences inside the
group, disillusionment over time, and defection, return or capture. This article reports on a
sample of both male and female former ISIS members representing over 35 countries. It
examines their demographics, contextual, and other qualitative variants regarding their
psycho-social vulnerabilities and motivations for joining. It then discusses the influences
and recruitment patterns drawing them into the group, their roles, experiences, and
relationships inside it, variance in their will to fight and support violence, and their
disillusionment and attempts to leave (when it occurs)—as well as their advice to others
about joining. Although a convenience sample, the findings are consistent with other
quantitative studies on ISIS and we believe highly informative on many important topics.
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Introduction
ISIS is one of the largest and the most lethal terrorist groups to date. It
functioned with its so-called Caliphate as a proto-state for over four years.
At its zenith in 2014, ISIS had managed to take over approximately 40
percent of Iraq and 60 percent of Syria.1 It also attracted over 40,000
foreign fighters to its ranks from over 130 countries.2 ISIS terrorized those
in the territories it overtook, as well as mounted terrorist attacks all over
the world, in cities as far ranging as: Brussels, Dhaka, Istanbul, Jakarta,
London, New York, Nice, Orlando, Paris, and Sydney, to name but a few.
ISIS also spread its brand globally to over 14 affiliates across the Middle
East, Africa, and Central Asia.3
Moreover, it was one of the richest terrorist groups in history, with its
financing coming from a number of sources including: Bank theft, ransom
for hostages, takeover of the oil wells in Syria, and subsequent sale of oil to
Turkey and Assad’s government. Additionally, it profited from looting, sale
of antiquities, human trafficking of sex slaves, taxation of its population,
and takeover of local commerce in the areas under its control. ISIS at one
point had a daily income of 3 million United States Dollars (USD) with an
annual revenue of 2.9 billion USD.4
Understanding the inner workings of this group is crucial, but it is only
possible to glean such information from a number of vantage points: From
studying its publicly available propaganda and statements, its captured
internal documentation, and interviewing those who either lived under or
actually served inside the group. While there is a great deal of readily
accessible ISIS propaganda to study, internal documentation has only
recently been collected and captured, but is still not available to all
researchers. What has been studied of ISIS propaganda provides a rich
body of literature which can be accessed elsewhere, but is not covered here
in any detail given the desire to report on what ISIS members themselves
say in primary interviews.
Primary interviews of those who lived under ISIS are possible for those
willing to travel into Syria and Iraq where ISIS is unfortunately still active.
In these danger zones, interviews of victims of ISIS are relatively easy to
come by, but interviews of ISIS cadres are much more difficult to obtain,
as most prison interviews reside within the realm of classified intelligence,
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and research access is often limited to one-off and superficial interviews.
Defectors’ and returnees’ interviews are possible closer to home, but are
often hard to locate, access, and may still constitute a threat. All three
groups of ISIS insiders (prisoners, defectors, and returnees) are often
reluctant and fearful about giving interviews.
Consequently, there is a dearth of primary source data regarding terrorists
in general—and ISIS in particular—due to the difficulty of gaining safe
access to imprisoned, defected, or returned terrorists for purposes of
interviewing them and, once access is achieved, convincing them to talk.
The researchers involved in this study worked hard to overcome such
obstacles with the primary researcher managing to gain access to a
significantly large and wide range of both male and female, local and
foreign, younger and older, ISIS cadres ranging from foot soldiers and
family members, to ISIS emirs and members of the emni—the ISIS
intelligence arm. The resulting data set has yielded an enormous cache of
information that sheds new light on how ISIS recruits both locally and
from afar, the motivations and vulnerabilities with which its recruiters
create resonance, how travel to ISIS is arranged and occurs, entry into the
group including training and indoctrination, positive and negative
experiences inside the group, and changes over time regarding
commitment to the group and the militant jihadist ideology espoused by
it— changes often related to disillusionment, defection, return or capture.
This study reports on 220 in-depth interviews and managed to include
interviews from ISIS cadres hailing from 35 countries and representing 41
ethnicities.

Research Method
The research method for this study was to attempt to gain access to any
member of ISIS, male or female, whether he or she be a defector, returnee
from the battleground, or imprisoned ISIS cadre. Then, we conducted a
semi-structured, video-recorded, in-depth psychological interview with
that ISIS member. The lead researcher worked with prison officials, fixers,
translators, and research associates who arranged access, recorded video,
and translated the interviews and in two cases carried out the interview in
the researcher’s absence (in one case due to the ISIS cadre arriving
unannounced, and in the second due to the interviewee refusing to talk to
a woman).5
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In all cases the semi-structured interview started with a brief history of the
individual focusing on early childhood and upbringing, covering life
experiences prior to becoming interested in ISIS. This was done to create a
baseline with inquiry into basic demographic information, educational
level, family stressors, and other background information. Questions then
turned to how the individual learned about the conflicts in Syria, and
about ISIS, and became interested to travel or join. Questions explored the
various motivations and vulnerabilities for joining and obtained a detailed
recruitment history: How the individual interacted with ISIS prior to
joining, whether recruitment took place in-person or over the Internet, or
both; how travel was arranged and occurred; ISIS intake procedures and
experiences with other militant or terrorist groups prior to joining ISIS;
and training and indoctrination. The interview then turned to the
interviewee’s experiences in ISIS: Family, living and work experiences
including fighting history; inquiry about what was good and what was not
good in ISIS; questions about disillusionment and doubts; traumatic
experiences; experiences and knowledge about one’s own or others
attempts to escape; being, or witnessing others, being punished;
imprisonments; owning slaves; treatment of women, and marriages. The
interview covered where the individual worked and lived during his or her
time in ISIS, and changes over time in orientation to the group and its
ideology, often from highly endorsing it to wanting to leave.
A strict human subjects protocol was followed in which the researchers
introduced themselves and the project, explained the goals of learning
about ISIS, and the interview would be video recorded with the additional
goal of using this video-recorded material of anyone willing to denounce
the group to later create short counter narratives for the ICSVE Breaking
the ISIS Brand Counter Narrative Project. This is a project that uses
insider testimonies denouncing ISIS as un-Islamic, corrupt, and overly
brutal to disrupt ISIS’s online and face-to-face recruitment and to
delegitimize the group and its ideology. The subjects were warned not to
incriminate themselves and to not speak about crimes they had not
already confessed to the authorities, but rather to speak about what they
had witnessed inside ISIS. Likewise, subjects were told they could refuse
to answer any questions, end the interview at any point, and could have
their faces blurred and names changed on the counter narrative video if
they agreed to it.
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These interviews took place in prisons, camps, interrogation rooms,
offices, and in the field in the countries of Syria, Iraq, Turkey, Belgium,
Denmark, Kosovo, Kyrgyzstan, Albania, and Kenya. More than half the
interviews took part in another language and required a translator,
although the researchers themselves could speak Albanian, Arabic,
Bosnian, French, Turkish, and Russian, as well as English. All of the
interviews touched on highly traumatic material and often required
psychological expertise to support the individual to continue speaking
about painful events that were difficult to discuss. The interviewer is a
research psychologist and has been conducting in-depth psychological
interviews and field research for over 25 years, has interviewed over 700
terrorists and their family members, and is highly experienced working
with translators and dealing with traumatic material and in quickly
gaining rapport in the interview setting. Hence, the interviews generally
went smoothly, and interviewees opened up and shared a great deal of
information. Local translators often offered helpful explanations of
locations and local customs to which the interviewees referred, but
sometimes their English was limited when translating quickly about highly
emotional topics. Thus, all of the interviews that were audio or video
recorded were retranslated by professionals after the fact (in a few cases
recording was refused) with the professional translators correcting any
mistakes made in the written records.
In general, the interviews took about an hour and a half. In that time,
there was a sense of closure in having covered most important topics, but
in some cases prison and camp authorities rushed the interview, which
made it difficult to go in-depth on all issues. In others, prison authorities
allowed the researchers up to five hours to interview; for instance, when
the author interviewed an ISIS emir in Iraqi prison for five hours about the
wide range of topics and experiences about which he had detailed
knowledge.

Sampling
The sample for this study is by necessity a convenience sample, as it is
extremely difficult to gain safe access to ISIS cadres to interview, and to
obtain their informed consent for an in-depth interview, thus random
sampling is not possible. The interviewer did attempt to obtain a
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representative sample in terms of requesting access to women as well as
men and attempting to talk to a wide range of nationalities and ethnicities,
age groups and roles fulfilled within ISIS.
To gain access to defected, returned, and imprisoned ISIS members, the
main author contacted numerous national authorities, security services,
police, journalists and others requesting the possibility to interview. Given
that the author directs the ICSVE Breaking the ISIS Brand Counter
Narrative Project, a project that creates video clips of ISIS insiders
denouncing the group that are then used for prevention and intervention
purposes globally, many national authorities strongly endorsed the project
and granted access to their prisoner population to help the project expand.
Police and journalists also at times had access to returnees and defectors
and helped gain access.
Once access was granted, it was still a challenge to gain permission from
the ISIS cadres themselves, who were often afraid to speak about their
experiences for many and varied reasons. Imprisoned ISIS members were
generally wary of being interviewed, many having had bad experiences
with journalists who were often less interested in the actual person and
experiences in the group than looking to promote horrific headlines. When
the interviewees understood that a sensitive and careful interview was
sought, that they controlled whether or not it would appear in public, and
that they could hide their identities, they were more willing to grant
permission to be interviewed. Nevertheless, many asked that their
identities be hidden in terms of having their names changed and faces
blurred in the counternarrative video, or the video never used, and at least
eight prisoners refused interviews altogether, as did some defectors. In
some cases, women only wanted to be interviewed by a woman and
refused to have males present. Two of the male interviewees (both
Albanian imams) were uncomfortable speaking with a woman, one
granting the interview only to a male colleague, the other sitting facing
away from the author and not making eye contact.
Risks for the researchers included the possibility of being attacked during
the interview or tracked afterward and harmed. Likewise, as many
prisoner and detainees are held in Syria and Iraq, there is the necessity to
travel into dangerous areas for those located in conflict zones, meaning
exposure to possible hostage-taking, bombs, missiles, mortars, and
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roadside IEDs, as well as attacks inside the prisons or camps themselves in
which riots occur and ISIS enforcers are active. In prisons and camps, a
guard usually remained in the room, or just outside it, and in some cases a
minder was assigned to watch the interview. Dangers existed in the
prisons, despite having a guard nearby, as the author was well aware,
having been shown during work in 2006 and 2007 a collection of metal
shanks created by prisoners in Camps Cropper and Bucca. Likewise, the
female guards in the camps all told about having been attacked themselves
inside the camps, and murders and riots among detainees had occurred
both in the camps and prisons in Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) territory
during the time period of these interviews.
Defectors interviewed out in the field feared for their safety and wanted to
be interviewed in highly private settings which increased the dangers for
the interviewers. ISIS defectors and those released from short stints in
prison also posed a risk, as some defectors told about being re-contacted
by ISIS and directed to work for them, or about their own wishes to return
to ISIS, or reneging on their denunciations and still wanting to be part of
ISIS.6 One ex-prisoner, for example, ended our time with him by telling us
that he hoped we would be beheaded in Syria, while another still endorsed
ISIS, and was later returned to prison for violent behaviors.7
It was never clear if defectors, and those released whom the researchers
met in the field, had totally disengaged from the terrorist group—or could
still be acting on its behalf—until the interview got well underway. In one
case, a Syrian woman being interviewed in Turkey admitted she hated
Americans and Westerners due to killings of civilians during bombings in
Raqqa, and that she wished to return to ISIS to die as a martyr on their
behalf. The researchers were relieved that she had not decided to martyr
herself that day or lacked the means to do so.8 Likewise, our Turkish
research colleague learned that ISIS members in Turkey had followed a
defector to one of our interviews and our colleague was warned by his
Turkish police colleagues that ISIS might try to kill him as a result. This
was no idle threat given other ISIS assassinations were carried out in his
border town of Sanliurfa.9 The researchers took all available precautions
for their own safety, but budgets did not allow for armed guards, armored
vehicles, and other security apparatuses. At times these were provided by
host governments, yet the risks of doing this research were considerable.
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The sample reported herein, collected over a period of four years and still
growing, consists of 220 ISIS defectors, returnees, and imprisoned ISIS
cadres interviewed from September 2015 to September 2019. Thirty-five
nationalities and 41 ethnicities are represented in the sample. The sample
consists of 182 males and 38 females. The participants were interviewed in
a variety of locations: 27 were interviewed in Turkey, three were
interviewed in Belgium, seven were interviewed in Kosovo (one in prison,
the rest in home settings), two in a Kyrgyzstan prison, one in an Albanian
prison, one in a Kenyan prison, 75 in Iraqi prisons, and 104 in detention
facilities in northeast Syria (prisons and camps) overseen by the SDF and
Kurdish Asayish, the Kurdish security. Two of the men (1.1%) and three of
the women (7.9%) never lived in ISIS territory. Some worked as recruiters
in their home countries, while others were stopped en route to Syria and
sent back; these were also included in the analysis, as their not having
lived under ISIS did not preclude them from being active believers in the
ideology and contributors to the cause.

Demographic Results
Males. The 182 men in the study were from 35 countries and represented
41 ethnicities. 51.1 percent were foreign members of ISIS, while 34.1
percent were Iraqi and 14.8 percent were Syrians.
On average, they were 26.00 years old at the time that they joined ISIS
and were 29.95 years old at the time of the interview. This is a bit older
than conventional expectations of terrorists ages, perhaps because many
foreign fighters were motivated in part by lack of employment,
discrimination, and marginalization among other issues. Male foreign
fighters were older than their local counterparts, with an average age of
27.88 at the time they joined ISIS and an average age of 32.58 at the time
of the interview. While the expectation for terrorists’ ages tends to equal
the age estimates of criminals in general, factors like discrimination and
marginalization, as well as subscription to ISIS’s ideology, may prevent
burnout and motivate older people to become involved or to maintain
their involvement in the terrorist cause.
Most men in the sample had spent on average 30.4 months inside ISIS.
This relatively short period, in comparison to other studies of terrorist
group membership, is due to ISIS’s relatively short lifespan, with only a
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few joining in its inception (as al-Qaida in Iraq) in 2007 and remaining
until the siege at Baghouz in 2019. In contrast, most interviewees joined
after the declaration of the Caliphate in 2014, and either left or were
captured as ISIS began losing territory in 2017.
Of the men, 81.3 percent were born and raised Sunni Muslim, while 1.6
percent were born and raised Shia Muslim, later converting to Sunni
Islam. Of those who were not raised in Islam (n=28), half were born into
Sunni Muslim families and (n=14) reverted to the religion of their parents,
and the other half (n=14) converted from atheism, or Christianity.
Prior to joining ISIS, 44.5 percent of the men had never been married,
46.7 percent were married, and 4.4 percent were divorced. One of the
drawing points of ISIS for men in countries where unemployment often
precludes marriage—like Tunisia—or for men finding it difficult to marry
for other reasons, was the promise of marriage. ISIS even ran a marriage
bureau in Raqqa to arrange marriages for ISIS members. As a
consequence, at the time of the interview, only 24.2 percent had remained
single, 71.4 percent were married, 1.1 percent were divorced, and 0.5
percent were widowed. Given many women lost their partners in battles
and bombardments, the low rate of widows in the sample reflects the ISIS
practice of encouraging swift remarriage.
Socioeconomically, 65.4 percent of the men were from middle-class roots,
with 18.7 percent and 3.8 percent coming from working- and upper-class
families, respectively. The men had on average 11.18 years of education
and represented a variety of occupations prior to joining ISIS: 43.4 percent
worked in blue collar jobs, 15.4 percent were students, 13.2 percent
worked in white collar jobs, 6.6 percent were itinerant, 3.8 percent were
self-employed, 2.2 percent were unemployed and not looking for work,
and 1.1 percent were unemployed. Among the foreign men, 31.2 percent
worked in blue collar jobs, 19.4 percent worked in white collar jobs, 15.1
percent were students, 8.6 percent were itinerant, 4.3 percent were selfemployed, 4.3 percent were unemployed and not looking for work, and 2.2
percent were unemployed. The higher levels of unemployment and
underemployment among foreign men indicates that these men had fewer
opportunities and ties to home, allowing them to leave for Syria and Iraq,
and were perhaps more susceptible to ISIS’s promises of wealth, social
inclusion and work.
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Females. The 38 female participants were from 18 countries and
represented 22 ethnicities. Of the women, 76.3 percent were foreign
members of ISIS, while 13.2 percent were Iraqi and 10.5 percent were
Syrians. They were, on average, 24.32 years old when they joined ISIS and
27.33 during the interview, having spent 32 months on average inside the
group. Of the women, 55.3 percent were born and raised Sunni Muslim,
while 5.3 percent reverted to the religion of their parents. In contrast to
the low number of male converts represented, 34.2 percent of the women
in the study (all foreigners, consisting of 10.7 percent of the foreign fighter
sample) had converted to Islam from atheism or Christianity.
Prior to joining ISIS, 28.9 percent of the women had never been married,
60.5 percent were married, and 7.9 percent were divorced. At the time of
the interview, however, only 2.6 percent remained single, with 57.9
percent married, 7.9 percent divorced, 5.3 percent separated, and 26.3
percent widowed. This accords with ISIS’s strong policy of requiring
women to marry or stay locked up inside of dirty, overcrowded, and
difficult to survive ISIS guesthouses called madhafas. Of the women who
married during their time in ISIS, regardless of whether they arrived
married and were widowed or arrived single, 70.0 percent were married
only once, 20.0 percent married twice while in ISIS, and 10.0 percent
married three times while in ISIS. 44.7 percent of women were widowed at
least once while in ISIS and 10.5 percent were divorced.
Socioeconomically, the women paralleled the men in that 63.2 percent
came from middle-class families, with 21.1 percent and 5.3 percent coming
from working- and upper-class families. Similar to the men, the women
had on average 11.59 years of education, but their employment
represented a slightly narrower scope: 26.3 percent were students, 21.1
percent worked in blue collar jobs, 18.4 percent were housewives and stayat-home mothers, 13.2 percent worked in white collar jobs, 5.3 percent
were unemployed and not looking for work, and 2.6 percent were
itinerant.
Table 1. Demographic Results
Demographic

Mean

Standard Deviation

Range

Age When Joined

26.00
24.32

8.68
7.45

10-55
12-44
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Age When Left
Age at Arrest
Age at Interview
Socioeconomic
Status
Length of Time in
ISIS (Months)
Religious Status

Marital Status
(Prior)
Marital Status
(Current)
Employment

Education (Years)
Legal Status at
Interview

27.86
9.22
10-53
26.57
8.05
14-48
29.11
9.22
12-57
26.96
8.29
14-48
29.96
9.06
14-58
27.33
7.56
14-49
18.7% Lower Class; 65.4% Middle Class; 3.8% Upper Class
21.1% Lower Class; 63.2% Middle Class; 5.3% Upper Class
30.40
24.18
<1-84
32.00
16.30
<1-60
81.3% Born Sunni Muslim; 1.6% Born Shia Muslim; 7.7%
Revert; 7.7% Convert
55.3% Born Sunni Muslim; 5.3% Revert; 34.2% Convert
44.5% Single; 46.7% Married; 4.4% Divorced
28.9% Single; 60.5% Married; 7.9% Divorced
24.2% Single; 71.4% Married; 1.1% Divorced; 0.5% Widowed
2.6% Single; 57.9% Married; 7.9% Divorced; 5.3% Separated;
26.3% Widowed
2.2% Unemployed and Not Looking for Work; 1.1%
Unemployed and Looking for Work; 6.6% Itinerant; 3.8% SelfEmployed; 43.4% Blue Collar; 13.2% White Collar; 15.4%
Student
5.3% Unemployed and Not Looking for Work; 18.4%
Wife/Stay-at-Home Mother; 2.6% Itinerant; 21.1% Blue Collar;
13.2% White Collar; 26.3% Student
11.18
3.73
0-18
11.59
2.63
5-15
1.6% Served Sentence and Released; 1.1% Stay of Sentence with
Conditional Release; 72.5% Incarcerated Pre-Sentence; 2.2%
Currently Serving Limited Sentence; 2.2% Currently Serving
Life Sentence; 5.5% Sentenced to Death; 14.8% Unknown
2.6% Stay of Sentence with Conditional Release; 76.3%
Incarcerated Pre-Sentence; 10.5% Currently Serving Limited
Sentence; 10.5% Unknown

There are scant samples to which the present sample may be compared.
Thus, there is no way to determine representativeness of the sample.
However, a noted publication describing foreign terrorist fighters (FTFs)
in ISIS is the 2017 report by The Soufan Center. The present sample’s 116
FTFs represent approximately 0.4 percent of the total foreign fighters
identified by The Soufan Center. Individual countries, however, are
represented in different proportions.
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Table 2. Comparison to The Soufan Center Reported Numbers of FTFs
Country

Percent in Sample

Switzerland
Belgium
Trinidad and Tobago
United States of America
Canada
Kosovo
Germany
Serbia
Australia
The Netherlands
Algeria
Bosnia and Herzegovina
Albania
Sweden
Turkey
Denmark
Indonesia
United Kingdom
Libya
Kazakhstan
Morocco
Pakistan
Russia
Kyrgyzstan
Tunisia
Azerbaijan
France
Saudi Arabia

4.3%
2.3%
2.3%
2.3%
2.2%
2.2%
2.0%
2.0%
1.8%
1.8%
1.2%
1.2%
1.1%
1.0%
0.8%
0.7%
0.7%
0.6%
0.5%
0.4%
0.4%
0.3%
0.3%
0.2%
0.2%
0.1%
0.1%
0.1%

Regionally, the present sample includes 1.7 percent of the FTFs from the
Balkans, 1.6 percent of the FTFs from North America, 0.9 percent of the
FTFs from Western Europe, 0.4 percent of the FTFs from South and
Southeast Asia, 0.2 percent of the FTFs from The Maghreb, 0.1 percent of
the FTFs from former Soviet Republics, and 0.09 percent of the FTFs from
the Middle East (excluding Syria and Iraq).
The Soufan Center’s report also includes specific data regarding foreign
women in the Islamic State. The present sample includes approximately
8.2 percent of the Belgian women who joined ISIS, 4.2 percent of the
German women, 2.9 percent of the Canadian women, 2.3 percent of the
Kosovar women, 1.1 percent of the Dutch women, 0.6 percent of the
92
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French women, 0.5 percent of the Kazakh women, and 0.4 percent of the
Moroccan women.10

Results
The qualitative interview data obtained in these interviews was coded on a
myriad of variables ranging from psycho-social vulnerabilities to ISIS
recruitment, to methods of recruitment, travel, experiences inside ISIS,
disillusionment, and will to fight. Data was coded both for presence and
level of significance, ranked on a Likert Scale: 0 = “Not Present”; 1 =
“Present but Not Important”; 2 = “Present and Somewhat Important”; 3 =
“Present and Very Important”. In some cases, there was missing data due
to the interview being cut short, the subject having no experience with that
variable, or a failure to explore it much in the interview due to time
constraints or the subject being unwilling to discuss. Two members of the
ICSVE staff created the coding system through numerous iterations,
beginning with approximately 60 basic variables and ending with 288. The
second author coded the interviews and discussed with the interviewer any
variables about which she was not certain.
Psycho-Social Vulnerabilities to ISIS Recruitment
Psycho-social vulnerabilities to ISIS recruitment were coded in terms of
emotional abuse, physical abuse, sexual abuse, emotional neglect, physical
neglect, exposure to domestic violence, substance abuse in the household,
mental illness in the household, parental separation or divorce, having an
incarcerated household member, having a parent die when the participant
was a minor, having unmarried parents, having a father with multiple
wives, family conflict, poverty, leaving home early, personal divorce,
previous criminality, and unemployment or under-employment. The
subjects themselves mentioned most of these variables in taking their brief
family histories. However, the first ten psycho-social vulnerability
variables are the Adverse Childhood Experiences, life events and
circumstances that—when occurring in combination with each other—
exponentially increase a child’s risk of mental and physical health
difficulties in adulthood.11
In this study, psycho-social vulnerability variables are distinct from
motivation variables. Psycho-social vulnerabilities refer to life experiences
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and situations that made the individual susceptible to recruitment or able
and willing to travel to ISIS. Motivations are the reasons that the
interviewees gave for why they made the concrete decision to join ISIS.
There are many variables that are therefore included in both the psychosocial vulnerabilities and motivations sections of this article but may have
different results. For instance, unemployment and under-employment
were coded as vulnerabilities because the people who were unemployed or
under-employed were not as tightly tied to their home communities and
may have felt that their home countries had failed to provide them with
opportunities for meaning and socioeconomic advancement. These same
people, however, often did not mention employment as a motivation for
joining ISIS; that is, even though being unemployed made it easier to leave
home and travel to Syria, they did not do so because ISIS promised them
employment.
Similarly, drug and alcohol abuse, as a vulnerability, often contributed to
foreigners’ feelings of jahiliyyah (the Islamic view of sinful ignorance)
causing them to revert or convert to Islam while still having little in-depth
knowledge of the religion, making them susceptible to charismatic
recruiters promising them a new life defined by honor and purity. If the
foreigners joined ISIS with the expressed intention of getting clean, this
was coded as a rehabilitation motivation.
Among the men, the most commonly present vulnerabilities were poverty,
unemployment and underemployment, and a criminal history. When
rating the vulnerabilities in relation to the participant’s own assessment of
reasons for joining ISIS, the top three were poverty, unemployment and
underemployment, and substance use. It should be noted that
unemployment and under-employment were coded as one variable,
including not only those without a full-time job, but those who could not
find permanent work or felt that they could not get jobs consistent with
their abilities and education level as well. These vulnerabilities turned out,
not surprisingly, to be contextual and based on the location of the ISIS
recruit. For instance, the most common vulnerability for male locals was
poverty, whereas for male Europeans it was personal substance abuse and
for male non-European foreigners it was previous criminality and
substance abuse.
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Many Iraqi youth described being hungry, since for those who lived in
territory that ISIS controlled, ISIS quickly took over all the trade and made
it difficult to find a job without working for ISIS. Many of these youth
joined expecting the ISIS training camp to deliver good meals, pay, and
other financial benefits. Eighteen-year-old Iraqi Abu Huthaifa for
example, describes the way that poverty made him vulnerable to ISIS’s
recruitment efforts, “The videos got me because I was in a poor family and
I thought joining would help us buy a house, because we were in a rental.”
Unemployment and underemployment represented not only a financial
challenge for locals, but also a grievance for many participants who felt
unable to rise in socioeconomic status. Thirty-five-year-old Iraqi Abu
Hamid al Baghdadi, for instance explains, “A lot of things prevented me
from getting this job: Corruption, bribes, sectarian shares.” For these
frustrated Sunni Iraqis and Syrians, suddenly ISIS was offering promising
employment opportunities.
For male Europeans, the most common vulnerability was personal
substance abuse. Europeans also cited unemployment and
underemployment as grievances they attributed as a consequence of being
Muslim. In many cases, vulnerabilities were multi-factorial. Thirty-eightyear-old Dutch Munir Hassan al Kharbashi, who is of Moroccan descent,
recalls his parents divorcing when he was 15, after which “[I] started living
the criminal life in my youth, smoking and drinking…do what your friends
do, trying to be with them. Joy riding, stealing cars, making money to
smoke and enjoy women.” Munir continued with his reckless behavior
“until I was 23. [Then,] I started focusing on my religion, praying and
going to mosque. I started having other friends.” He also recalls Dutch
anti-immigrant politician Gert Wilders being problematic for him in terms
of promoting discrimination: “I had a beard and long clothes, and my wife
and I felt discriminated against.” After numerous bouts with the law and
three failed marriages he decided to go join the ISIS Caliphate.
For male non-Westerners, the most common vulnerabilities were previous
criminality and substance abuse. For example, 29-year-old Tunisian Abu
Sara had been drinking excessively during the Tunisian Arab Spring in
2012. He explains,
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“I used to sit in my room and drink with some music and so. In
mosques, I used to see people with long beards saying to me, ‘You
must stop drinking, this is wrong, you have to pray with us.’ I never
prayed in my life. After some time, I realized that I was wrong, so I
quit alcohol. I just go to night clubs and smoke cigarettes. After a
while, I stopped going to clubs and I wanted to pray to feel good, as
they claim. I wanted to save my life.”
Among the women, the most commonly present vulnerabilities were
poverty, family conflict, and prior trauma, with Europeans citing family
conflict most often and locals citing poverty most often. The most
meaningful vulnerabilities in relation to the participant’s own explanations
about joining ISIS were prior trauma, poverty, and family conflict—in that
order. Describing the impact of her prior traumatic experiences, 46-yearold Canadian Kimberly Pullman speaks about suffering deep distress
watching the televised news from the trial of a serial rapist who had
assaulted her, among many other Canadian women:
“I started failing at university when his trial began, I had a hard
time focusing, stopped sleeping, [had] nightmares... It was like a
DVD that wouldn’t shut off; I couldn’t make it stop.”
Falling into a relationship over Twitter with a man already in ISIS,
Kimberly found solace as he talked to her about restoring honor and that
she shouldn’t feel suicidal when her services as a nurse were so needed by
Muslims in Syria. Slowly, he seduced her into marrying him over the
Internet while she was mired in emotional despair over previous traumatic
episodes, and he guided her into escaping her problems by coming to
Syria, ostensibly to help others.
Women from Europe also cite discriminatory practices that made life
difficult and even hard to hold employment. Thirty-year-old Umm
Abdallah from Germany says once she converted and began to wear hijab,
she was told to find another job and then finding that in hijab she could
not get hired to positions equal to her capabilities. Similarly, 37-year-old
Lisa Smith from Ireland left the military after converting and being told
she could not wear hijab to work.12 Twenty-five-year-old Belgian Selene,
who is of Turkish and Moroccan descent, recalls being afraid that her
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children would experience discriminatory practices, as she had in Europe,
saying, “I know people who change their name. They won’t get work.”
Others speak about being spit at or insulted on the streets for wearing
Muslim attire in public. Some young European female converts were
thrown out of their family homes after converting, making them
vulnerable to being taken to Syria by male partners. Others followed their
husbands and boyfriends, believing that they would be divorced or
abandoned if they didn’t agree to travel, although many women also
encouraged their husbands and partners to travel.
Table 3. Vulnerabilities
Vulnerability

Men
Mentioned

Women
Mentioned

Men
Average
Score

Women
Average
Score

Criminal History
Prison History
Emotional Abuse
Physical Abuse
Sexual Abuse
Emotional Neglect
Physical Neglect
Domestic Violence Exposure
Household Substance Abuse
Household Mental Illness
Parental Separation/Divorce
Incarcerated Household Member
Deceased Parent
Unmarried Parents
Father Had Multiple Wives
Family Conflict
Personal Substance Abuse
Poverty
Left Home Early
Personal Divorce
Unemployment/Underemployment
Prior Trauma

13.7%
10.4%
0%
1.7%
0%
1.7%
0%
1.7%
1.7%
2.2%
8.8%
1.1%
12.1%
1.1%
5.0%
9.3%
13.2%
24.2%
2.7%
3.8%
19.2%
11.6%

5.3%
0%
7.9%
7.9%
2.6%
0%
0%
5.3%
7.9%
0%
21.0%
5.2%
7.9%
7.9%
0%
23.6%
5.3%
26.3%
10.5%
7.9%
2.6%
23.6%

0.29

0.11

0.00
0.05
0.00
0.05
0.00
0.04
0.05
0.05
0.20
0.03
0.32
0.01
0.06
0.28
0.34
0.65
0.06
0.07
0.49
0.32

0.22
0.25
0.08
0.00
0.00
0.11
0.22
0.00
0.42
0.14
0.19
0.19
0.00
0.69
0.17
0.69
0.34
0.24
0.03
0.72

Recruitment Influencers
Understanding ISIS’s recruitment is crucial, given their unprecedented
efficacy in drawing foreign fighters to their cause and to the battlefields.
Jihadist terrorist groups have recruited Muslims living in the Western
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diaspora for decades, most notably during the war following the Soviet
invasion of Afghanistan and the war in Bosnia, and increasing greatly
following the terrorist attack of September 11, 2001.13 ISIS can be
differentiated from other militant Islamist groups by its rising during the
Internet era, a time when the world, especially for young adults, feels
smaller and more connected than ever before. ISIS recruits in many ways,
from face-to-face on the ground recruiting to utilizing friends’ and
relatives’ networks, as well as through cold-calling online. In the latter,
recruiters utilize methods of swarming and love-bombing, in which those
who respond to ISIS recruitment on social media by liking, retweeting,
sharing or otherwise endorsing ISIS propaganda messages are then
contacted by ISIS recruiters.14 The recruiters pay them lavish attention
and try to meet their needs in efforts to seduce them into the group.
Others attract recruits by drawing them into religious and political
conversations designed to take them down the ISIS pathway.15
The most frequently mentioned and most meaningful influencers in terms
of joining for men were friends, face-to-face ISIS recruiters, and passive
viewing of videos posted mostly on YouTube, Facebook, and Twitter by
ISIS, other related groups, and also from Syrians suffering Assad’s
atrocities. Twenty-nine-year-old Belgian Abu Usama al Belgique recalls
watching videos that convinced him that it was his obligation as a Muslim
to help the Syrian people, saying,
“[It was all] emotion for me going to Syria. Assad is killing civilians,
barrel bombs, and airstrikes. Civilians were calling people, crying,
‘Where are the Muslims in the world? You can help us militarily and
humanitarian!”
Many European and Balkan respondents recall watching such videos and
hearing the cries of Syrians pleading with the world, asking, “Muslims,
Muslims, where are you? Come and help us!” Many felt helpless in the face
of the world powers remaining passive and felt they must take it into their
own hands and go and join the fight.
Others were moved by statements made by their own and others’
politicians and religious leaders. Thirty-five-year-old Trinidadian Zyad
Abdul Hamid recalls, “I saw John McCain saying Syrians needed help. I
was a Muslim and thought it’s binding upon me to help.” Saudi Abu
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Jazeera credits state-run television programs for motivating him to come.
“Saudi, Qatari TV channels. This is what pushes us to come here.”
Abu Fatima, a 30-year-old German, describes the influence of a close
friend on his decision to join ISIS: “We had many discussions. He was
convincing me. He said we are far from the fronts, no air strikes, just
come.” Others made friends over the Internet with those who went ahead
and were encouraged by these new friends to come—many who
misrepresented the realities on the ground in order to convince their new
friends to travel and join ISIS.
While the Assad videos portrayed atrocities and victims calling out for
help, ISIS propaganda videos often depicted the Caliphate as victorious
and as a good place to live as a devout Muslim. The majority of males and
females in the sample who spoke to ISIS cadres on the ground or watched
ISIS propaganda materials expected a far more positive experience than
what they actually encountered. ISIS portrayed hijrah, what they claimed
as obligatory Islamic migration to live under shariah law and the
Caliphate, as a means of gaining personal significance, purpose, belonging,
living under Islamic ideals, enjoying prosperity, and being protected. They
left out that the men would be forced to fight for the group whether or not
they wished to, that women would need to remarry in succession if their
husbands were killed, that once in there was no leaving, that the
punishments for non-compliance were brutal, and that the ISIS emni
could accuse and punish anyone, at any time, for anything. Thus, the
recruiters portrayed an idealistic Islamic state and those traveling to join
ISIS specifically for the most part, except those who went specifically to
fight against Assad’s atrocities, claimed that they went believing in a sort
of utopian dream which turned out drastically different from the actual
reality.
Forty-five-year-old Indonesian, Abdullah, recalls the influence of a faceto-face recruiter upon him: “He had a long beard. He was inviting people
to Islam,” he said, describing the low-key approach that later turned
rigidly fundamentalist. “He once told me, ‘You are not Muslim.’ I was
surprised. I’m good, my father and my mother are Muslims. He said, ‘If
you don’t pray and don’t fast, you are not Muslim. You are a disbeliever.’”
Slowly Adbullah was talked into changing his lifestyle and then selling all
his belongings to follow this recruiter into traveling to Syria to join ISIS.
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In addition to ISIS’s distinction for the absolute numbers of foreign
fighters swayed by their propaganda (40,000), ISIS also recruited many
Western women to their ideology and territory. Female foreign ISIS
members’ motivations for joining are varied, but it is clear that ISIS used a
specific recruitment strategy, namely, using women as online recruiters
and glamorizing the ISIS lifestyle, even developing online magazine
articles specifically targeting them.16 For women in the present sample, the
most frequently mentioned and most meaningful influencers were
spouses, Internet recruiters, and parents. Given that young women,
particularly in conservative cultures, are often dependent on their spouses
and parents and vulnerable to following their lead, especially if they have
young children, and also that women and girls, in general, often make
moral decisions in reference to relationships, it should be no surprise that
relationships were primary influencers for females.17 That does not,
however, negate their personal agency in deciding to join ISIS. Many
women followed husbands, some fearing emotional or financial
abandonment, and three in the sample claimed not to even understand
where they were going, but the majority knew they were joining the
Islamic State and agreed to it, albeit not making the decision completely
independently.
Salma, a 22-year-old Belgian woman, remembers how her father said her
life would improve when she travelled to join ISIS:
“My Dad, he wanted to live the really Islamic life. My Dad came first
and then he called me. He just said, ‘Life is better here. You can
wear your whole hijab. We’re not oppressed here.’”18
Twenty-nine-year-old German Umm Bilal describes how her husband
decided to go to ISIS and convinced her to join him in Syria:
“He called after three weeks. He said there are a lot of people here
who need drugs, orphans. Many need someone to take care of them.
It’s a good thing for Allah and gives a high degree for Allah.”
Internet recruiters often were seductive to these women, promising
marriage, significance in ISIS and traditional lifestyles. Aisha, a 27-yearold Kenyan woman, describes falling in love with her online recruiter, with
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whom she believed she would fight and eventually go to Paradise: “He said
he wanted to get married. We would go to Iraq and marry and fight
together. And go to Jannah together.” He ultimately began preparing her
for a suicide mission.19
Table 4. Influences
Influence

Men
Mentioned

Women
Mentioned

Men
Average
Score

Women
Average
Score

Spouse/Partner Influence
Parent Influence
Sibling Influence
Extended Family Influence
Friend Influence
ISIS Recruiter Influence
Preacher Influence
Internet Recruiter Influence
Passive YouTube Influence
Passive Facebook Influence
Passive Twitter Influence
Passive WhatsApp Influence
Passive Telegram Influence
Passive Other Internet
Influence
Mainstream Media
Influence
Prison Influence

2.2%
3.8%
6.6%
9.9%
35.7%
25.3%
19.8%
10.5%
24.7%
11.6%
5.5%
1.6%
1.6%
1.1%

55.3%
15.8%
5.3%
5.3%
13.2%
7.9%
0%
18.4%
13.1%
7.9%
7.9%
2.6%
0%
0%

0.05
0.11
0.20
0.29
1.03
0.77
0.57
0.31
0.75
0.34
0.16
0.04
0.03
0.03

1.85
0.43
0.14
0.11
0.35
0.24
0.00
0.58
0.36
0.24
0.26
0.09
0.00
0.00

19.2%

10.5%

0.54

0.28

5.5%

0%

0.15

0.00

Motivations for Joining
Motivations for joining ISIS differed dramatically by location. For foreign
males who travelled to Syria and Iraq, the most common motivation was a
helping purpose, meaning they wanted to provide humanitarian and
defensive militant aid to the Syrian people. For European women, the top
motivators were Islamic identity and family; non- European women
simply wanted to pursue an Islamic identity. Men were more focused on
employment, and the women were more focused on fulfilling basic needs,
along with personal and familial safety. For both travelers and locals,
solidification of an Islamic identity and an Islamist ideology focused on
building a Caliphate were also present, with locals also often referring to
grievances such as wanting Sunni rights that they believed would be
delivered by a Sunni Islamist-run government as opposed to the Shia (and
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Alawite) dominated governance in Syria and Iraq. Job seeking was also
operational for foreign fighters and spouses who were unemployed or
under-employed at home.
The helping-purpose mentioned by both men and women came from those
who were watching Assad’s atrocities while the international community
stood silent, or spoke against Assad, but did little to stop him. Meanwhile,
as mentioned earlier, strongly stirring videos were circulating showing
Assad’s atrocities, and Syrians calling out for foreigners to come to their
assistance. These motivations, representing higher ideals and aspirations
to play a role in the greater world, parallel those identified by other
researchers studying terrorism across time and ideologies.20
Twenty-eight-year old Kosovar Abu Albani witnessed Serbs invading his
village as a young child. Years later, when his friends started passing
around self-made videos from Syrians of Assad’s atrocities showing
butchered corpses, bombed out rubble, even gassed neighborhoods and
women and children killed en masse, all his childhood terror and distress
was brought back to the surface. He vividly remembered the American
“foreign fighters” who had rescued Kosovo and felt that it was now his turn
to go help—that it was his duty as a Muslim.
ISIS cadres from many parts of the world, but particularly the Balkans,
who remembered suffering the effects of war themselves, were deeply
distressed by watching videos of Assad’s atrocities and Muslims calling out
for outsiders to come help. Those who traveled early during the Syrian
Civil War to fight Assad, or simply to help in a humanitarian manner,
seemed to be well-intentioned in the beginning but were later drawn into
ISIS for various reasons. Abu Albani, for example, wanted to repeat the
good acts of Americans that had freed Kosovars, but he later fell in with
ISIS and admitted to participating in some of their gory genocidal acts
such as those committed against the al Sheitat tribe.21 Many foreign
fighters spoke about becoming trapped in Syria as the Free Syrian Army
(FSA) and Ahrar al Sham began hunting foreign fighters and the Turkish
border was blocked for them. They sought safety in ISIS territory where
they were welcomed, but also forced to join and become fighters for the
group.
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Many men and women described joining due to an underlying longing for
an Islamic Caliphate to be re-established and having been extremely
moved by the declaration of the ISIS Caliphate, supported by the fact that
ISIS had taken control of such significant swathes of land in both Syria
and Iraq. For instance, 44-year-old Havaz Hamadi Omar recalls,
“I was in Sweden when Baghdadi declared his Caliphate. Since we
were in our childhood, we are studying in our school that one day
the Caliphate will come and it will be established, so when we saw it
in Mosul, we think this day has come, and we have to go and join
it.”
Some of those who, like Omar, came to live under the Islamic State
Caliphate claimed they didn’t know they would be pushed into becoming
fighters. Islam Khenkar Aliev, a 25-year-old Russian, explains how he was
working to develop himself Islamically: “I didn’t come here for fighting, I
came for knowledge and shariah, I wanted to be a civilian and live in the
Islamic State.” While it may have been self-serving denial, many men
expressed complete surprise at being forced into fighting and claimed they
came to learn and to live in an Islamic utopia, not to fight.
Tunisians and Europeans also often referred to being hassled at home for
trying to live a Salafi lifestyle, the former hassled by security services, the
latter by Islamophobic Europeans. Tunisian Abu Tahir, for instance,
recalls being hassled by the police and even interrogated, as he explains,
“If you go often to the mosque, they [the security services] look at you in a
different way. This affected me.” A Tunisian friend who had gone before
him told Abu Tahir that if he came to the ISIS Caliphate, he would be able
to practice his Islamic rituals unhindered.22
Muslim women often are the ones who suffer the most from Islamophobic
attacks in the West, as their identities are so clearly marked due to their
Islamic dress. It was not surprising then to learn that women often cite
suffering from Islamophobia as a reason for wanting to live under what
they believed would be Islamic ideals. Thirty-seven-year-old Lisa Smith,
for instance, enjoyed her career in the Irish army until she converted to
Islam, when she says, “I asked if I could wear headscarf. They said, ‘No.’ I
knew I had to cover so I got out. If they had said ‘yes’ I may have stayed in
till now.” She also referred to not wanting to serve in a military that was
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fighting Muslims. Feeling unable to follow her new faith while in the
military, alongside a charismatic recruiter telling her it was her duty to
come live under the newly declared Caliphate was only one of the many
experiences that Lisa says caused her to believe that she could not fully
pursue her religion in Ireland, and therefore needed to make hijrah to the
Islamic State.23
Women moved by the declaration of the ISIS Caliphate and impressed by
its territorial gains also described believing they had a duty to migrate and
live in the Caliphate. Thirty-two-year-old Umm Mohamad, who grew up in
Holland, says that she was swayed to travel to ISIS by exposure to
mainline news as well as ISIS propaganda: “I believed that every Muslim
has an obligation to live where they can practice their Islam. Their
propaganda was very strong. ISIS was strong.” Umm Mohamad points out
that it was not just ISIS propaganda that was convincing, and that in the
beginning it was mainstream news that convinced her, as she explains,
“Western media was also a big hype: They [ISIS] took over half of Iraq in
three, four days.”
Others tell about their belief in the terrorist claim of having an Islamic
duty to make hijrah. Beatrice, a 31-year-old woman from Belgium, had
recently converted to Islam when she learned about hijrah and was told
that it was her obligation to move to a country ruled by shariah. She
remembers, “I wanted first go to Malaysia or Indonesia. I don’t know. I
was confused. Then I read about Syria. I was on Facebook, you know, and I
spoke with people in these days. And then, I fell to ISIS.”24
Women frequently followed husbands. For instance, 23-year-old Belgian
Cassandra Bodret, describes her fear of abandonment by her husband:
“He started warning me that if I don’t come, he’s going to divorce
me, take a second wife—that I cannot accept. He came before me,
and I was so touched, that he was here alone. Then I followed.”
While foreign women often decided to follow their partners into ISIS, one
shouldn’t fall into the trap of zombifying women, as many security services
do when describing them as completely powerless and without agency, as
though they were completely manipulated and dependent on their male
partners who decided to travel to and join ISIS. Women who followed their
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men into ISIS were for the most part also often just as motivated to join,
encouraging their husbands and agreeing with them about ideology and
travel, and some were even the main driving force behind travelling. One
Krgyz grandmother, for example, believed ISIS claims that there would be
a signing bonus for as many family members as would come. She talked
half of her extended family into traveling to Syria to join. She was not
heard from again, and only her young grandson managed to escape. He
was smuggled home with the message that they had believed lies and were
doomed inside ISIS.25
Only three of the women interviewed in this sample were actually deceived
by their husbands and credibly appeared to have had little to no choice in
traveling or didn’t know to where they were going. All the rest chose to
travel with their partners into ISIS, or traveled on their own, knowing they
could have chosen otherwise and remained at home with extended family,
divorced, or tried to talk their spouses out of joining. Many women
recount their own strong desire to join the ISIS Caliphate, live under
shariah and follow a traditional lifestyle. Some were proud that their
husbands would be employed by ISIS, enjoy free housing and other
benefits, and be helping to build the Caliphate.
As far as local women, the sample did not include many Syrian and Iraqi
women (n=9) and those interviewed were all imprisoned in Iraq where
they faced serious sentencing, except one Syrian woman who was
interviewed in Turkey. Among the Iraqi locals, three young women tell of
having been taken from Iraq into Syria by male family members belonging
to ISIS and claim to have had no choice in the matter. These were also
later forced to marry in Syria and seem genuinely traumatized by that
experience, describing their husbands as rapists. The Syrian women
interviewed, also in Iraqi prison, had been extracted from SDF territory to
Iraq due to being wives of high-ranking Syrian ISIS members. These
women claim not to have had integral roles as ISIS members, serving more
as spouses, and claim to have joined not of their own volition, although
they may have been hiding their guilt. Thus, it is hard to comment on local
women’s motivations for joining from this sample.
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Table 5. Motivations
Motivation

Men
Mentioned

Women
Mentioned

Men
Average
Score

Women
Average
Score

Basic Needs
Employment
Personal/Family Safety
Family Ties
Immediate Sexual
Gratification
Emotional Relationship
Escape
Adventure
Romance
Masculine Identity
Feminine Identity
Islamic Identity
Discrimination
Ideology-Related
Hassling
Ideology-Related Arrest
Belonging
Personal Significance
Helping Purpose
Anger Purpose
Caliphate Ideology
Jihad Ideology
Hijra Ideology
Takfir Ideology
Anti-Western Ideology
Sunni Rights
Eternal Rewards
Eternal Honor
Redemption/Forgiveness
Rehabilitation
Fear of Hell
Tricked

18.7%
22.6%
4.4%
4.4%
0%

13.2%
5.3%
13.2%
42.1%
0%

0.49
0.59
0.12
0.13
0.00

0.30
0.11
0.34
1.11
0.00

5.5%

0%

0.15

0.00

4.4%
0.5%
1.7%
N/A
28.6%
7.2%
3.3%

2.6%
15.8%
N/A
5.3%
50.0%
13.2%
2.6%

0.11
0.01
0.04
N/A
0.75
0.20
0.10

0.08
0.42
N/A
0.11
1.42
0.42
0.08

0.5%
6.0%
8.8%
30.8%
13.2%
22.5%
19.3%
9.3%
2.2%
6.6%
11.5%
4.4%
0.5%
1.1%
5.5%
1.6%
0.5%

0%
5.3%
5.3%
21.0%
2.6%
13.1%
7.9%
7.9%
2.6%
0%
0%
5.3%
0%
2.6%
0%
5.3%
2.6%

0.02
0.15
0.21
0.86
0.34
0.61
0.56
0.26
0.06
0.17
0.32
0.13
0.01
0.03
0.14
0.04

0.00
0.11
0.17
0.56
0.06
0.36
0.19
0.25
0.06
0.00
0.00
0.17
0.00
0.08
0.00
0.14

Roles
Men’s roles in ISIS were far more varied than the women’s roles. The most
commonly mentioned roles are that of ribat (border patrol) and fighter,
with 34.6 percent and 35.2 percent of men reporting that they took on
these roles, respectively. Of the men, 51.6 percent admitted to serving in
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one or the other, or both, fighting roles during their time in ISIS. Likely
many more were fighters but did not incriminate themselves by admitting
it. Other commonly reported jobs were engineers, mechanics, and medical
personnel. It was common for men to become terrified and disillusioned
from battleground experiences or injured, and for both reasons they often
cycled in and out of fighting roles. Those who were injured could get an
ISIS doctors pass to serve in an administrative post while rehabilitating,
and some also managed to get reassigned through connections. In both
cases, those who were able-bodied were pressured back into fighting roles.
Likewise, many men who became disillusioned with ISIS deserted and
simply stopped working for the group. The cost of living in Syria was such
that if they had brought money in with them, or were clever enough to run
a side business, they could survive with a relatively high quality of life.
Some of these described going to the riverside restaurants in Tabqa and
enjoying family life—particularly those who had just married and were
starting their families. Many of the deserters were arrested at some point,
sometimes tortured, and forced back into military service.
In contrast, 97.4 percent of the women in this sample claimed to have
acted as wives and mothers, and the roles of suicide terrorist, face-to-face
recruiter, and medical personnel were also reported by one woman each.
Additionally, two women report being members of the hisbah, ISIS’s
morality police. Men who speak about women’s roles explain that Western
women in particular were recruited into the ISIS hisbah and to be online
recruiters based in a house in Raqqa. Likewise, ICSVE collected evidence
that women in ISIS trained as fighters, learned to handle machine guns,
grenades, and IEDs. One woman was reported to wear a suicide vest at all
times. They also trained as spies and carried money and messages.26
Marriage and motherhood were highly encouraged, if not outright
mandated, for ISIS women. Women who arrived unmarried or who were
widowed were not allowed to live as single women, and were generally
forced to live in a women’s guest house, what ISIS referred to as a
madhafa. Conditions in the madhafas were so bad that single women and
widows who otherwise would not remarry, frequently agreed to marriage
simply to escape from them. Twenty-four-year-old Hoda Muthana, among
others, says she did everything she could to avoid being forced back into a
madhafa. However, in her case, this meant she had to try to run a small
business on her own in order to live. She begged others to help her get
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diapers and supplies for her infant, as ISIS did not allow women to travel
in a taxi alone. Hoda finally relented and remarried out of desperation.27
This coercion to remarry resulted in many ISIS women having serial
marriages, sometimes even marrying before their iddah, the mandatory
waiting period of four months in order to determine if a pregnancy
resulted from the previous marriage, was completed between marriages.
Likewise, many of these women are now arrested and in camps with their
children from their multiple marriages. The children having different
fathers and therefore different claims to nationality greatly complicates
matters of repatriation for ISIS mothers and their children.
Table 6. ISIS Roles
Role

Men Reported

Women Reported

Ribat
Fighter
Suicide Attacker
Teacher
Preacher
Emni
Hisbah
Shurta
Wife/Mother
Transporter
Ambulance
Accounting
Intake
Housing
Oil
Emir
Madhafa Oversight
Cook
Spy
Face-to-Face Recruiter
Internet Recruiter
Medical
Engineer/Mechanic
Other

34.6%
35.2%
1.6%
1.1%
0%
1.6%
3.8%
3.8%
N/A
4.4%
2.2%
2.7%
2.2%
1.6%
3.3%
3.3%
2.7%
3.3%
2.2%
0.5%
2.2%
6.0%
7.7%
20.9%

0%
0%
2.6%
0%
0%
0%
5.3%
0%
97.4%
0%
0%
0%
0%
0%
0%
0%
0%
0%
0%
2.6%
0%
2.6%
0%
0%

Sources of Disillusionment
In this study, sources of disillusionment are defined as events, behaviors,
and values that the participant found to be contrary to what had initially
drawn them to ISIS or caused them to decide to defect from the group. The
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sources of disillusionment have, in previous research, been described as
push factors. The impetus to join a terrorist group consists of both push
(reasons to leave one’s home, such as marginalization or discrimination)
and pull (reasons to go to the terrorist group, such as the promise of
dignity and purpose) factors. In contrast, disengagement from terrorist
groups has been shown to be primarily linked to push factors alone, that
is, disappointing or even traumatizing experiences in the group, rather
than new opportunities or political changes at home.28 However, it should
be noted that many of the respondents kept in close Internet contact with
their mothers and some expressed deep regret for having caused their
mothers distress by joining ISIS. Likewise, many male respondents
referenced avoiding escaping ISIS and returning home when it might have
still been possible to do so out of certainty that they would face
prosecution and prison at home.
For men in this sample, the most commonly mentioned sources of
disillusionment were mistreatment of civilians, lack of food, and
mistreatment of women, with the most meaningful sources of
disillusionment being mistreatment of civilians, lack of food, and
mistreatment of ISIS members, which included imprisoning and torturing
those who tried to leave. In contrast, the most common sources of
disillusionment for women were the mistreatment of women, lack of food,
and the acts of ISIS attacking outside their territory.
Mistreatment of civilians is often defined as hypocrisy on the part of ISIS
leadership, illustrated by Syrian Ibn Mas, who says,
“They smoked in groups, but in public they looked for anyone
smoking. Then they didn’t advise him but imposed a penalty on
him. In the same time, they forgot to hold themselves accountable.”
This mismatch between the ISIS hisbah arresting, fining, and flogging men
for smoking while the hisbah themselves smoked, as well as the hypocrisy
of ISIS covering up rapes carried out by their members while brutally
punishing sex crimes of any type in the general population is often cited in
the sample. Likewise, men frequently cited mistreatment of women as
something that disappointed them, but not as something that pushed
them out of ISIS, although there were a few exceptions in this regard.
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Nineteen-year-old Syrian Ibn Ahmed worked as a guard at a facility where
ISIS held 450 sex slaves for serial rape. Once, he witnessed a pregnant
woman being punished for spitting in the face of an ISIS soldier: “They
took her out in the corridor and stomped on her and her abdomen. When
she was done, they had kicked her so badly she was covered in blood [had
miscarried].”29 Of all the horrors he witnessed, the rape of a 15-year-old
girl by a Sudanese foreign fighter remains etched in Ibn Ahmed’s psyche:
“He raped this girl. I swear to God she was hemorrhaging […] she died of
internal bleeding. Our commander forbade us to talk to anyone about it.”
When Ibn Ahmed saw that the Sudanese man was pardoned and released
from ISIS prison after only seven days, he became overwhelmingly
disgusted and decided to flee the group.
Abu Albani, who remains completely radicalized, admits that ISIS treated
women especially poorly. He explains that when women got sick, ISIS
would not permit them “to go to a hospital by themselves […] They
wouldn’t take them to a hospital. They didn’t take care of them.” He recalls
a German widow of a Kosovar ISIS fighter: “She is in Syria with four of her
kids and she is sick from cancer. They are not taking her back to Kosovo so
she can get cured, or to some other place. Can you imagine? She is left
alone and sick in Syria.”30
The women who cited attacking outside of ISIS territory as a source of
disillusionment often speak of sympathizing with women and children
killed in ISIS attacks in Europe. Those who are from Europe express shock
and dismay as well as concern for their own family members back home.
Speaking about the attack at the Zaventem airport in Brussels, 22-year-old
Belgian Salma says, “Killing people on a battlefield, they have guns
shooting at you, but killing innocents, it could have been me.”31
Table 7. Sources of Disillusionment
Source of
Disillusionment

Men
Mentioned

Women
Mentioned

Men Average
Score

Women
Average Score

Civilian
Mistreatment
Failure to Fight
Assad
Cooperation with
Assad
Local Favoritism

22.5%

7.9%

0.63

0.25

3.8%

0%

0.10

0.00

1.7%

0%

0.05

0.00

11.6%

7.9%

0.31

0.22
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Foreign Fighter
Mistreatment
Lack of Pay
Lack of Food
Attacking Outside
of ISIS Territory
ISIS Member
Mistreatment
Women
Mistreatment
Sunni
Mistreatment
Practice of Takfir
Corruption/Theft
Bad Governance
Deradicalized
No Longer
Supported ISIS
No Longer
Believed in
Caliphate
No Longer
Supported Jihad
No Longer
Supported Takfir

16.5%

2.6%

0.47

0.08

11.0%
20.9%
5.5%

2.6%
34.2%
18.4%

0.24
0.51
0.13

0.06
0.92
0.56

19.8%

18.4%

0.53

0.50

19.2%

71.1%

0.39

1.97

6.6%

2.6%

0.20

0.03

7.7%
19.2%
13.7%
6.1%
15.9%

2.6%
2.6%
2.6%
7.9%
7.9%

0.21
0.48
0.36
0.14
0.45

0.08
0.06
0.06
0.26
0.22

7.2%

13.2%

0.19

0.42

2.2%

2.6%

0.06

0.08

0%

0%

0.00

0.00

Traumatic Experiences
Traumatic experiences in ISIS were separated into three categories:
Atrocities and crimes that were committed against or experienced by the
participant, those witnessed by the participant, and those actively
committed by the participant. The last of these is something the
researchers warned subjects not to talk about so as to avoid incriminating
themselves, but at times they would recount crimes for which they had
already been prosecuted or spoke openly about crimes they had
committed, despite the warning. In cases where they spoke about crimes
for which they had not yet been prosecuted, the subjects were asked to
move on to other topics so as not to harm themselves and provide evidence
that might later be used against them.
Of the male participants, 46.2 percent reported experiencing bombings,
34.1 percent were imprisoned by ISIS, and 12.1 percent experienced
physical torture. Smaller percentages of the men reported being wounded
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in battle (8.8%), being wounded in bombings (8.2%), and being flogged
(5.5%). Of the female participants, 65.8 percent experienced bombings,
42.1 percent were widowed by ISIS-related violence, and 21.1 percent were
forced into marriage. Other traumatic experiences included being
imprisoned by ISIS (15.8%) and rape (7.9%).
All of the subjects described bombing as terrifying, particularly those who
stayed in Raqqa during heavy bombardments and for those who stayed in
ISIS until the end, most moved from Raqqa to Mayadeen and then crossed
over the Euphrates to escape Russian and Syrian bombings which
eventually followed them. Twenty-seven-year-old Dutch Abu Sarayah
recalls of Hajin, “Everywhere we went there were lots of bombings. I got
injured one time, we were living at a friend of mine and the house got
bombed by Russians and we had to pull [my wife] out of the rubble.” She
had a broken leg, and the baby was fine. Those who made it to the last days
of the Caliphate continued to flee bombings as they moved down river,
ultimately ending in Baghouz. There, many described living in dug-out
trenches where they tried to stay below ground level to avoid being hit by
snipers while the entire area was bombarded. Twenty-eight-year-old Saudi
American Abu Suahib recalls in Baghouz, “The coalition was very brutal in
its bombings, killing whoever, smashing houses full of women and kids.”
Forty-six-year-old Australian Abu Imran recounts in nearby Hajin, “In the
last two months there were a lot of bombs. All the houses around me were
bombed. I thought, ‘It’s my turn, we are going to die.’” When the U.S.
coalition became involved, the bombardments, even in Raqqa, became
much more precise and drones hunted anyone who went outside, killing
those who appeared to be ISIS members. To avoid being identified and
killed by the drones, ISIS men began donning burkas but this only resulted
in women being targeted by drones as well as men.
ISIS’s torture methods came from Iraqi and Syrian security service
members-turned-ISIS and were particularly gruesome. Abu Jason, a 25year-old from Switzerland, remembers being tortured while imprisoned by
ISIS: “They put me inside a tire, and chained my hands to poles… no
water… under the sun […] I was perspiring, and they gave me a little food.”
Other forms of torture recounted by participants included electrocution,
waterboarding, rape, and sexual assault. Additionally, torture included
being beaten by rubber hoses and fists, being kicked, being hung from
poles or the ceiling, being forced to listen to and watch the torture of
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others, and being held for long hours in horrifically contorted stress
positions.32
Women who lived in the ISIS madhafas recounted the bad conditions and
mistreatment endured there, including being unable to leave without
agreeing to marriage. Twenty-two-year-old Iraqi Sahar’s male ISIS family
members took her into Syria with them. There, she was raped by the
husband she was forced to marry. Upon capture, she learned that she was
pregnant. After the trauma she suffered, Sahar says, “I cannot love this
baby.” When asked if she would get an abortion, she replies, “He’s a
victim; I will not allow myself to do something wrong to this victim.”
Instead, Sahar hopes that the baby will be adopted, but knowing that is
unlikely, she worries and is unsure whether her family could ever “accept
my baby or love my baby.” Iraqi women who bore babies under ISIS
marriages and are now widowed often face the added complication of
being unable to register them legally.
ISIS women lacked rights in marriage, and many Syrian and Iraqi local
women were forced to marry ISIS men. European female ISIS members in
particular cited their shock and dismay over learning that they had to
endure whatever abuse their husbands meted out to them. Twenty-sixyear-old Belgian Bouchra Abouallal was the second wife to an ISIS
member who kept her under his violent control. Bouchra claims he
controlled her phone and posted on her social media: “He threatened
Belgium with my Facebook account, he ruined my life." Bouchra
eventually ran away from her husband, knowing that divorce would be
nearly impossible.33 The difficulty for women to initiate divorces was
corroborated by Lisa Smith, a 37-year-old Irishwoman, who explains that
during fights with her husband, he told her, “If you go to the judge [for a
divorce], I will say you are a kufr [an unbeliever and therefore a spy].” The
punishment for spying was death, so Lisa stayed with her emotionally and
physically abusive husband until he was killed in Hajin.34
The men also report witnessing many atrocities during their time in ISIS,
including executions (23.1%), executed corpses (17.0%), hearing about the
killing of a family member (15.9%), and torture (15.4%). The crimes
witnessed by women were most commonly hearing about the killing of a
family member, usually their spouse having been killed in battle or by a
bomb attack, (55.3%), seeing executed corpses (10.5%), witnessing torture
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(5.3%), and seeing a family member being killed, often by bombings
(5.3%).
The executions described by the participants were no less gory than those
posted by ISIS that shocked viewers all over the world. Abu Hamza, a 25year-old Syrian, paints a terrifying picture of the incident that haunts him:
“They put his head on the block […] he moved so the [executioner] could
not kill him, so someone pulled his hair. He moved again so the axe came
to his head and broke his skull. He was suffering so badly. He didn’t die
immediately.” Similarly, describing the moment at which she became
widowed, 15-year-old Iraqi Dina recalls, “My husband resisted ... They
killed him in front of me.”
Youth particularly spoke of being coerced into suicide missions and being
forced to execute others, usually in beheadings. One Iraqi described being
called to a scene of five Peshmerga soldiers dressed in orange jumpsuits
arranged in a row on their knees. He was handed a knife and instructed to
behead them while ISIS cadres filmed it. Knowing he would be killed if he
refused, the youth carried out the beheadings.
Most of the subjects describe living under extreme fear, some from their
first entry into ISIS, others developing this sense of terror as they realized
that ISIS was a totalitarian state; the ISIS emni could accuse anyone of
being a spy or other crimes and public executions and torture were normal
occurrences. As a result, most did not have many friends and did not talk
openly, sometimes not even sharing their doubts and fears within their
families. Subjects told how ISIS trained youth to spy, even on family
members, and how people informed on one another to the ISIS emni.
Due to our warnings not to self-incriminate as well our human subjects’
desire not to potentially cause harm, few men admitted to us about
committing crimes while in ISIS, with 6.0 percent reporting that they had
killed on the battlefield, 2.7 percent reporting beheading someone, 1.6
percent reporting performing non-beheading executions, and 1.1 percent
reporting performing physical torture. One man also admitted owning a
slave. The crimes of beating, flogging, and biting were all reported by one
woman, who served in the ISIS hisbah.35
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Killing on the battlefield was an act laden with emotion for many of the
participants. While for many the battlefield provided an appropriate and
moral setting for killing, some regretfully remembered killing innocents in
battle, such as that with the Sunni al-Sheitaat tribe, as 20-year- old Syrian
Abu Musab, who, upon returning from killing fellow Sunni countrymen,
was rejected by his own mother for having done so: “People hated us
because we had killed the al-Sheitaat tribe.” Twenty-one-year-old Syrian
Umm Rashid had survived so many traumas, from losing her first husband
who served al Nusrah, to having her parents die in regime bombings, that
once she married into ISIS, she fell completely under their ideology and
empowered by them. She admitted that as part of the ISIS hisbah, she not
only flogged and beat other women, “I also used to bite. It is like an
artificial tool. Put in the mouth, we can bite any part of the body, her back,
shoulders, breasts, from places you can’t see from the outside and where
there is ample meat.” When asked if she was horrified by having done so,
Umm Rashid says, no, that she felt the opposite—that brutally enforcing
ISIS rules banished her fears and appeared to her as the right thing to
do.36
Finally, 12.8 percent of the men and 2.7 percent of the women were invited
to become suicide bombers. While a few in this sample had agreed, they
escaped or were arrested before carrying out their missions. Likewise, 3.3
percent of the men and none of the women admitted that they had been
invited by the ISIS emni to attack their home countries, but many more
knew of others who had been invited to attack at home.
Table 8. Traumatic Experiences
Traumatic Event

Men Reported

Women Reported

Flogging Victim
Physical Torture Victim
Electrocution Victim
Biting Victim
Psychological Torture
Victim
Rape Victim
Forced Marriage Victim
Forced to Fight
Experienced Bombing
Wounded in Battle
Wounded in Bombing
Starvation

5.5%
12.1%
1.6%
0%
5.5%

0%
5.3%
0%
0%
5.3%

0%
0%
1.6%
46.2%
8.8%
8.2%
3.8%

7.9%
21.1%
0%
65.8%
0%
5.3%
5.3%
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Imprisoned by ISIS
Imprisoned by Another
Terrorist Group
Widowed by ISIS-Related
Violence
Execution Witness
Stoning Witness
Executed Corpse Witness
Rape Witness
Torture Witness
Battlefield Deaths Witness
Family Killed Witness
Friend Killed Witness
Death of Family
Killed Others on Battlefield
Performed Non-Beheading
Execution
Performed Beheading
Performed Beating
Performed Flogging
Performed Biting
Owned a Slave
Invited to Attack Home
Country
Invited to Suicide Attack

34.1%
0.5%

15.8%
0%

1.1%

42.1%

23.1%
3.3%
17.0%
2.2%
15.4%
9.9%
1.6%
1.6%
15.9%
6.0%
1.6%

7.9%
2.6%
10.5%
0%
5.3%
0%
5.3%
0%
42.1%
0%
0%

2.7%
1.1%
0%
0%
0.5%
3.8%

0%
2.6%
2.6%
2.6%
0%
0%

12.6%

2.6%

The Will to Fight
The will to fight describes the motivation cited by ISIS fighters for why
they fought and continued to go to battle for ISIS, oftentimes even after
they were disillusioned. Commonly noted wills to fight were fighting the
regime of Bashar al-Assad (9.9%), being a true believer in the ISIS
Caliphate and ideology (13.2%), and fear of the brutal punishments meted
out by ISIS if they refused to fight (12.6%).
Describing his motivation to fight Assad’s army, 32-year-old Mauritanian
Abu Omar says, “I wanted to fight the regime. In the news, even America
was saying Bashar [al-Assad] is attacking his own people; doing crimes
against his own people.” In contrast, 23-year-old Dutch Marwan Rashid
explains the difficult choice he made to continue fighting, even though he
no longer believed in ISIS’s cause: “In [ISIS] you cannot say ‘no’ for ribat
or for fighting, either you go to ribat or go to prison, so for most of us
foreign fighters it was between prison and fighting.”
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Table 9. The Will to Fight
Will to Fight

Men Mentioned

Claims Never Did
Fighting Assad
True Believer
Afraid of ISIS Consequences
Employment
Afraid of Outside Consequences
Afraid of Both ISIS and Outside
Consequences
Sunni Rights
Believed Would Go to Jannah
Fighting Iraqi Government/Army
Gun Excitement
Forced
Chosen by Family to Fight
Loyalty
Family Ties
Told Fighting Was His Obligation
Takfir Ideology
Cleanse Self of Sins
Fear of Hell
Given Choice Between Fighting and
Suicide
Basic Needs

29.1%
9.9%
13.2%
12.6%
7.7%
7.1%
3.3%
2.2%
2.2%
1.1%
1.1%
1.1%
0.5%
0.5%
0.5%
0.5%
0.5%
0.5%
0.5%
0.5%
0.5%

Radicalization Level
Because the interviews followed a largely chronological scheme, the
participants’ level of self-reported radicalization could be gleaned
retrospectively at two timepoints, as well as the current timepoint.
Therefore, the three timepoints recorded are: Prior to joining ISIS, at the
participants’ peak level of involvement, and currently, at the time of the
interview. The level of radicalization was defined as an ideological
commitment to ISIS and militant jihad in general, determined based on
statements indicating that the participant was not at all radicalized (coded
as 0), somewhat radicalized (1), very radicalized (2), and fully radicalized
(3). In the coding scheme, fully radicalized people were those who still
considered themselves committed members of ISIS. In contrast, people
rated as very radicalized were those who still believed in the violent
jihadist ideology but had become disillusioned regarding ISIS, and did not
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believe that ISIS was the group to achieve those goals. For men, the
average radicalization level at the prior, peak, and present timepoints were
2.26, 2.39, and 1.29. For women, the average radicalization level at those
three timepoints were 2.07, 2.38, and 0.87. These scores indicate that, for
both men and women, ISIS’s initial ideological indoctrination and the
experiences of living in the Caliphate increased ideological commitment.
However, over time—with the fall of the Caliphate—having either escaped,
defected, arrested, or disillusioned over negative experiences, both men
and women significantly deradicalized. This is an important point as many
argue for deradicalization schemes with ISIS prisoners. However, this data
demonstrates some level of “spontaneous deradicalization” happening in
many cases without any formal programming in place. This spontaneous
deradicalization occurs based on ISIS’s own failures. One deradicalized
ISIS female respondent explained this phenomenon the most succinctly
saying, “I didn’t need any deradicalization program. ISIS itself was the
best deradicalization program ever.”
Abu Sara, a 29-year-old Tunisian, provides an example of a participant
whose radicalization level declined over time: “Yes, I believe the Islamic
[State] is not Islamic but a terrorist organization; maybe in the beginning I
didn’t think so but after I work with them, there were changes.” Some,
however, remained steadfastly radicalized, as in the case of Younes, a 27year-old Belgian returnee from Syria who showed a journalist an ISIS flag
hanging in his bedroom, says: “I didn’t change my beliefs; I still believe
living under Islamic law [is] better to live under than in a democracy.”37
Proclamations of Innocence
Articles detailing the risks and benefits to “talking to terrorists” have
mentioned the tendency for terrorists to claim that they had no idea that
the group was committing such horrific attacks, and that they simply
joined for humanitarian purposes, as many of the participants in this
study also claimed.38 While none of the participants denied knowledge of
ISIS’s atrocities at the time of the interview, many denied participating.
Just over forty percent of the men and 31.6 percent of the women in this
study claimed that ISIS had cheated, lied, manipulated, or otherwise
tricked them into joining. This is an important point to consider in that
many felt bad that they had joined ISIS, and were sorry for what they had
taken part in, but they generally blamed ISIS, rather than taking full
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responsibility for their own actions in supporting a virulent terrorist
group.
While many considered themselves victims in the sense of having been lied
to, this excuse may only be feasible for those who joined ISIS prior to the
capture of Mosul and the establishment of the Caliphate in 2014. At that
time, the mainstream media rarely featured news regarding atrocities
carried out by the organization. Of the participants who joined ISIS in
2014 or later, when the group’s true nature had largely been exposed in the
mainstream media and through its own social media posts, 68.0 percent of
the men and 40.0 percent of the women said that they felt lied to by ISIS.
Those who didn’t feel lied to may have believed a self-serving lie, or it may
be those who joined ISIS had narrowed their focus to listening only to ISIS
propagandists who did lie and tried to portray the Caliphate positively.
Likewise, ISIS recruiters often told their recruits not to listen to
mainstream news as it was lying about ISIS as part of a larger
Islamophobic goal to tarnish the name of Islam. Thirty-two-year-old Umm
Mohamed, a Dutch woman of Moroccan descent, says that she learned
early on not to trust what she saw on the news in Holland: “I don’t believe
the media, as a Moroccan Muslim. The Western media lies about Muslims;
they said the Taliban throws acid on women.” She also credited the media
hype about ISIS for convincing her that they were the true Caliphate and it
was only once she experienced the horrors of ISIS that she realized, “what
was said [against ISIS] in the media was true.”

Discussion
The results of this study provide an extensive description of a small but
diverse sample of ISIS members providing insights on many key variables.
Though the sample cannot be called representative, it consists of ISIS
members ranging from minors to older adults, men and women, Muslims
by birth and converts, from all over the world. The results, particularly
when analyzed in detail on each of the variables, give decision-makers
valuable information regarding the characteristics, motivations,
influencers, recruitment, and travel patterns of those who joined ISIS.
Likewise, the experiences of ISIS members once inside the group,
including their ideological and weapons training, their experiences with
ISIS, changes in their will to fight and their commitment to the group, and
disillusionment or sustained support are important to understand. While
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the sample is not necessarily representative, it is large and diverse enough
to provide strong insights into these issues.
Likewise, policymakers in many countries are currently facing repatriation
issues and need to better understand how dangerous ISIS returnees may
be. This study found that the ideological indoctrination of ISIS—and
perhaps the act of moving to the Caliphate—at first increased commitment
to the group, but over time many ISIS members became disillusioned and
less committed to ISIS. As the Caliphate lost its territory and members
suffered bombardments, deaths of loved ones, battlefield losses, and
ultimately arrest, many began to spontaneously deradicalize without any
programming involved. Many in this sample gave strong testimonies
against ISIS, and agreed to appear in a counter narrative video denouncing
the group—sometimes asking that their identities be withheld for their
own protection. Others remained highly committed to the group and we
were also told about ISIS enforcers still operating in the prisons and
waiting for the resurgence of ISIS. Clearly, there is a continuum of
radicalization among those who were in ISIS and careful evaluations will
be necessary to decide on dangerousness and to program appropriately. It
is noteworthy that of the 1,000 European male foreign fighters currently
being held by the SDF, most of whom will likely be repatriated at some
point, this research interviewed 8.2 percent of them. Thus, this article
provides a small but highly relevant window into what the international
community may be facing with this population, showing that it is possible
to interview and learn from them in hopes of better preparing for their
return.
In 2016, the International Centre for Counter-Terrorism – The Hague
(ICCT) published a report on FTFs in ISIS. The report mentions that many
FTFs joined Jabhat al-Nusra. The present sample includes foreign
members of ISIS who did not travel to Iraq or Syria. However, of the 122
foreign-born men and women, 117, including 91 men and 26 women,
actually lived in ISIS territory and can therefore be referred to as FTFs. In
the present sample, 7.7 percent of FTFs reported having been members of
Jabhat al-Nusra before joining ISIS. The ICCT report also details the
considerations regarding returning FTFs, noting that “30 percent of
[foreign fighters] who have left from the European Union are now thought
to have returned.” Indeed, of the ISIS members in the present sample who
travelled to Syria or Iraq, 7.7 percent were interviewed in their home
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countries rather than in Iraqi or Syrian detention facilities. The report also
states that returning FTFs may be “disillusioned with terrorist practices,”
while others “return to their countries of origin with the intent and
capability to carry out terrorist attacks.” Of the nine ISIS members this
study interviewed in their home countries, one was deemed to be no
longer radicalized, one as somewhat radicalized, three as very radicalized,
and two as fully radicalized, with one person’s present radicalization level
unable to be determined, supporting the suggestion that FTFs may return
for a variety of reasons and with varying levels of radicalization. Likewise,
this research found evidence of those who defected, but then later wanted
to return to the group, making note that it is not always a one-way
trajectory out of terrorism.39
Therefore, a primary concern relating to returning FTFs is the provision of
deradicalization and programs while they are disengaged from the
terrorist group, and the prevention of further radicalization in prison and
reintegration programs upon their release. The present study supports
concern about prison radicalization. Of the foreign-born ISIS members in
the sample, 3.4 percent cited experiences in prison prior to joining ISIS as
an influence in their decision to join, with half of that group saying that
prison was a strong influence. Of all those interviewed, only two (1.7%)
reported taking part in a deradicalization program. Therefore,
participation in such a program could not be determined to be predictive
of the participant’s current radicalization level. Though, as noted earlier,
the subjects themselves reflected on disillusionment and spontaneous
deradicalization occurring as a result of bad experiences inside ISIS, as
well as seeing the defeat of ISIS and their having been imprisoned. One
particularly concerning case was Abu Albani, who became even more
radicalized and committed to ISIS during his prison term following
conviction in Kosovo for serving in ISIS. After he emerged from prison, he
was interviewed once again by the researchers, in which he told how he
had studied the texts of Maqdisi in Albanian while incarcerated and
become even more committed to the aims of ISIS.40
A striking issue in this study was how many foreign fighters came to ISIS
out of a desire to help beleaguered Syrians, underlining how important
foreign policy is and how interconnected the world has become. Young
men in particular were moved into action when they saw governments
failing to respond to the thwarted Syrian Arab Spring. Likewise, it is
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striking to see how strongly videos and Internet propaganda and
recruiting were in influencing foreign fighters and even locals to join ISIS.
Notably, 8.2 percent of the sample said they were recruited into ISIS solely
over the Internet, something that many researchers for years have denied
as a possibility. Evidently, today’s social media and the intimacy of chat
and video interactions makes it feasible for terrorist recruitment to occur
solely over the Internet—something policy makers in every country from
which ISIS fighters came must consider in terms of ISIS continuing to
recruit, now less for travel, and more for homegrown attacks.
Likewise, many travelers into ISIS referenced mainstream news as an
influencing factor—that the many gains made by ISIS touted on the
regular news made an impression in favor of ISIS for them. Similarly,
some subjects referred to ISIS recruiters warning them not to believe
mainstream news and to refer only to ISIS for information. Some
Europeans stated that they found mainstream news Islamophobic and
therefore ignored warnings about ISIS, chalking it up to Islamophobic
Western reporting. These indicators demonstrate how important it is that
mainstream media does not inadvertently glorify or spread terrorist
messages. Moreover, counter messaging efforts must take into account
how those listening to groups like ISIS may have narrowed their focus and
only listen to ISIS insiders rather than others for any assessment of the
group. Thus the importance of using actual ISIS insiders denouncing ISIS
such as those featured in the ICSVE Breaking the ISIS Brand Counter
Narrative videos.
It is also striking how naïve many Muslim recruits were in regard to their
hope that ISIS would be able to deliver a promised utopia. For foreigners,
the dream of becoming significant, having purpose, and a positive Islamic
identity were strong drivers to ignore the warning signs about joining ISIS.
Likewise, the ISIS provision of free housing and what appeared to be a
high-quality life appealed to many. Local Syrians and Iraqis were often so
hungry, literally and figuratively, for justice and dignity that they joined.
In all cases, the joiners were yearning for an Islamic dream of dignity,
justice, purpose, prosperity, and Islamic living. This underlines the fact
that when individuals cannot find these things in their own lives they may
turn to their religion and become more willing to ascribe to a manipulated
dream than they might otherwise ignore. This points to the need to
address local push factors and also delegitimize groups like ISIS in ways
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like the authors do in the Breaking the ISIS Brand Counter Narrative
Project by creating counter narrative testimonies of insiders that tell the
truth about how un-Islamic, corrupt, and brutal ISIS really is.41
In addition to results specific to ISIS members, the ICCT report cited
earlier also delves into the “nexus between FTFs and crime.” The report
states that, depending on the sample, between 20 and 50 percent of
jihadist terrorists have a criminal past. Of the total sample of FTFs in the
present study, 17.9 percent had a criminal history, with 22.1 percent of
European FTFs reporting a criminal history, again showing a strong
interaction between terrorism and prior criminal behavior. Finally, the
ICCT report further describes the role of women and children as FTFs. The
ICCT report first notes that approximately 17 percent of European foreign
fighters are women. In this sample, European women are more heavily
represented (28.6%). Among the entire sample, 17.3 percent of the
participants were women.42
Likewise, 67.7 percent of the participants reported having children that
they either brought with them to Syria or Iraq or that were born during
their time in ISIS, and 11.8 percent of the participants interviewed for this
project were minors themselves when they joined ISIS, with 5.9 percent
under the age of 18 at the time of the interview. The issue of minors
joining ISIS is a troubling one, particularly for those whose citizenship has
been stripped, as in the famous case of UK ISIS member Shamima Begum
(who has spoken with the main researcher but not yet given a full
interview).43 Minors should be treated with some deference for their
immaturity by the law, particularly for those who traveled to ISIS as
minors. However, in the case of ISIS it is also true that the group trained
even young teenagers to be killers. Particularly poignant are the cases of
young Iraqi and Syrian boys who went to training camps in hopes of being
fed, stayed only a short time, and are now facing long sentences for having
briefly served in ISIS. Similar to these are the tragedies of young local girls
forcibly married into ISIS and now incarcerated as ISIS members.
Although the present sample represents a small contingent of ISIS
fighters, particularly FTFs, it is relatively large compared to previous
studies involving interview data on FTFs. That the results of this study are
similar to those with smaller sample sizes provides evidence that “talking
to terrorists” is a research method with strong convergent validity. Dawson
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and Amarasingam’s 2016 article on 20 FTFs in Syria included jihadists not
associated with ISIS but nevertheless produced similar results. Just as the
FTFs in the present sample focused more on the sense of identity and the
“helping purpose,” while Iraqi and Syrian participants spoke more of
economic motivations, the FTFs in Dawson and Amarasingam’s sample
“provided justifications […] that were largely moral and religious in
character,” rather than economic, similar to this sample which found a
helping purpose often cited as a motivation for travel to Syria. The fighters
in their sample also reported having been influenced by both Internet
sources, specifically the speeches of Anwar al-Awlaki, and by close circles
of friends, both of which were among the most meaningful influences for
the male participants in this study.44
The results of this study demonstrate the utility and validity of qualitative
interview-based research with terrorists. From the stories of the
participants’ experiences in ISIS, it is clear that most FTFs living far from
ISIS territory are motivated more so by a desire to bolster their Islamic
identities which are often under attack by Islamophobic sectors of society,
as well as the desire to help the greater Muslim community, versus being
motivated for economic purposes. They are also responding to push
factors at home including marginalization and discrimination. In contrast,
these existential motivations are less important for those living in conflict,
who felt pressure to join ISIS in order to secure food and some semblance
of safety for themselves and their families. Thus, the risk of former ISIS
members rejoining the group if they are released or escape from SDF
detention in particular (as it is in a fragile state), even if they have been
disillusioned with much of ISIS’s ideology and methodology, should be a
concern for military and intelligence personnel the world over. Moreover,
the threat of FTFs returning to their home countries should be countered
through deradicalization programs that address the vulnerabilities,
influences, and motivations that drove them toward ISIS, as well as the
traumas that they experienced while living under ISIS. Likewise, once
rehabilitated these returnees will also need top-notch reintegration
programs that help them to address the originally motivating forces that
drove them into embracing terrorist ideologies in the first place.
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